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Foreword 
The authors are currently researching the Cornwall Local Energy Market (LEM) project, which is a three-
year trial from 2017 to 2020, jointly funded through the European Regional Development Fund and 
Centrica. The project is led by Centrica in association with project partners Western Power Distribution, 
National Grid, the University of Exeter and Imperial College London.  
The Cornwall LEM creates a local marketplace, via an online platform, which can draw together a 
community of renewable energy and low carbon generators, storage and demand side response (DSR) 
providers at both the domestic and non-domestic level. The platform allows participants in the local 
market to trade their flexible generation and demand in both traditional and new markets, either as a 
collective or individually.  
The LEM caters for sellers across the spectrum, from residential participants, to SMEs and I&C customers, 
to front of meter assets, to aggregators. That is, the LEM aims to provide an important route to market for 
DSR providers and small-scale generators, by bringing together providers who would be too small to 
participate in the established electricity markets individually. Independent aggregators already provide an 
essential role in bringing these resources into existing GB marketplaces (where their access is allowed) but 
the LEM can now provide these actors with a further avenue for trading customers’ flexibility, which should 
be beneficial to both parties – access to additional revenue streams for aggregators; whilst providing the 
LEM with increased local assets. 
Aggregators can therefore play an important role in selling flexibility in an independent LEM. Barriers 
faced by aggregators therefore can also affect the LEM – either directly in that in several circumstances 
they face the same barriers (mostly surrounding access to existing and new markets1), or indirectly, in that 
barriers which undermine the financial potential of aggregators could undermine their availability to 
transact with the LEM. 
There has been renewed interest in energy flexibility and DSR globally as a result of climate change and 
energy security issues coming to the forefront of the political agenda (Warren, 2014) and thus an 
interest in the role of the independent aggregator, as a new facilitator entering the retail energy 
markets.  
In the US, where demand response was pioneered, the role of independent aggregators is well 
understood (Engerati, 2017), and these actors are highly active, with market rules in New York (NYPDS, 
2014) and California (California ISO, 2015) for example, designed to ensure that aggregators flourish.  
However, the role of aggregators in Europe is less well understood and in most European countries the 
aggregator role doesn’t formally exist (Engerati, 2017). Whilst Article 17.3 of the EU ‘Winter Package’ 
(European Commission, 2016) requires member states to define frameworks for independent 
aggregators to enable full participation in retail markets, their ability to access those markets currently 
varies widely across Europe, with many European markets still closed to the independent aggregator. 
Meanwhile in GB, BEIS & Ofgem have identified some of the barriers facing aggregators in the ‘Smart 
Systems and Flexibility Plan’ (BEIS and Ofgem, 2017) and have put in place a range of solutions to 
unlocking those barriers, such as proposed changes to the Balancing and Settlement Code (BSC) and 
the ability to stack revenues across certain markets to increase viability (see Section 3.1).  
                                                                    
1 For full details on regulatory and market barriers see our overarching report (Bray, Woodman and Connor, 2018) 
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1. What is Aggregation? 
 
The act of aggregation can be defined as the grouping of different customers within the power system 
(i.e. consumers, producers, prosumers) to act as a single entity when engaging in electricity markets or 
when selling services to system operators such as the electricity system operator (ESO) or the 
distribution network operators (DNOs) (Burger et al., 2017).  Through aggregation the value of 
flexibility (DSR, storage and embedded generation2) can be enhanced by bringing together providers 
who would be too small to participate in the markets individually due to specified load sizes.  
Additionally, aggregation can also increase the reliability of flexibility by bringing together resources 
from across different industries and geographies within a single portfolio (CRA, 2017). This is known as 
the ‘diversity effect’ (Garcia-Rundstadler, 2018) as by mutualising between multiple technologies across 
different locations, aggregation can cushion the forecasting risk of intermittent technologies such as 
wind and solar. 
To date in GB, system flexibility requirements have been mainly procured by National Grid (the ESO), 
from large generators connected to the transmission network. However, with increased levels of 
smaller-scale intermittent generation, much of it connected at the distribution level; combined with 
decarbonisation targets and the emergence of new technologies, this potentially encourages an 
increased role for the aggregation of small-scale resources. And therefore, a role for aggregators who 
are skilled at bringing these resources to market. 
At present, aggregators do not need a licence to operate within the GB power system. Whilst some 
aggregators also hold a supply licence (supplier-aggregators) others do not and are termed as 
‘independent aggregators’. This report focuses on independent aggregators and the barriers which 
they face in fulfilling their role – barriers which may be in the form of regulatory procedures, financial 
penalties or from competition with other actors operating within the energy system. 
Various studies and consultations have been undertaken in recent years which examine the benefits 
that independent aggregators can bring to the GB electricity markets (as discussed in Section 3.1). All 
of these studies agreed that independent aggregators provide an important route to market for  
flexibility providers, with one survey highlighting that 74% of respondents who provided  demand side 
response (DSR)  did so through an independent aggregator3 (PA Consulting Group, 2016). 
Fundamentally, independent aggregators have detailed knowledge of navigating the various energy 
markets, which individual flexibility providers might lack (CRA, 2017).  
Aggregators also have an in-depth knowledge of their customer assets and requirements. This enables 
them to make decisions on behalf of their clients as to which markets they will be best placed to trade 
into; taking into account potential profit, length of contract, notification time, dispatch delivery time 
and duration of delivery. They also make decisions on which resources / clients to aggregate together 
to fulfil those obligations. The role of aggregators is therefore an active and involved role on their 
clients’ behalf. 
                                                                    
2 Embedded generators are those with a capacity below 100MW and connected to the distribution network 
3 This % is likely to have decreased recently with independent aggregators such as Flexitricity taking up supply licences in order 
to be able to trade across all markets (see Section 3.1). 
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Most of the literature on independent aggregators focuses on their ability to initiate DSR across their 
portfolio of sites. DSR itself can be split into two categories – implicit and explicit DSR. Implicit DSR 
refers to an event initiated in response to a price signal (i.e. reducing demand when prices are high); 
whilst explicit DSR refers to the selling of DSR into recognised electricity balancing markets. 
One reason why explicit DSR captures the main focus of literature attention is because this, rather than 
generation, is deemed to be where the most financial benefits can be made. This is because the value of 
DSR flexibility is greater outside of the market  (in helping to reduce imbalance penalties) than the 
value of generation assets within the market (Garcia-Rundstadler, 2018) as demonstrated in Section 
3.2.3 . However, aggregators can also play an important role in bringing small-scale renewable 
generation and battery storage into the market place, by pooling and therefore reducing costs of 
participation. 
In European markets aggregators deal mainly with large scale industrial and commercial entities, with 
limited examples of aggregators engaging with smaller non-domestic and domestic customers (BEUC, 
2018). This is true even in France where the domestic DSR market has been open since 2007 (PA 
Consulting Group, 2016). This is also true for GB; where a recent survey by Ofgem revealed that all 
aggregators who responded (including supplier-aggregators) worked only with I&C customers (Ofgem, 
2016a). However, with the introduction of smart metering and half hourly settlement; alongside 
advances in digital technologies; it is perceived by BEIS and Ofgem that flexibility aggregation will 
become more accessible to smaller non-domestic and domestic customers within the next few years 
(BEIS and Ofgem, 2016). 
Whilst the system and cost benefits of aggregation have been widely acknowledged (see Section 3.1), 
the actual role of aggregators themselves has been heavily debated across Europe. The European 
Commission have been supportive in their recent Electricity Directive (European Commission, 2017), 
yet anomalies persist throughout Member States regarding issues such as aggregators access to 
wholesale and retail markets and payment of compensation to Balancing Responsible Parties4 (BRPs) / 
suppliers. 
One of the key debates is the impact that aggregators might have on suppliers, particularly in relation 
to a supplier’s demand position in the market  (De Heer, 2015). In GB aggregators are currently 
independent of the supplier of the customer providing the flexibility and as such are not responsible for 
the customer’s metered supply; leading to demands from suppliers for compensation for loss of 
revenue (Baker, 2016) (see also Section 2.3).  
To enable independent aggregators to enter the market at scale, it is critical therefore that their role 
and responsibilities are clarified. In particular, it is important that the relationships between suppliers, 
BRPs, and independent aggregators are clear, fair, and allow for fair competition (SEDC, 2017). 
However, despite the evidence collated there is still, as yet, no legally defined role for independent 
aggregators in GB and their access to some markets is still uncertain. Whilst Article 17.3 of the EU 
Electricity Directive (European Commission, 2016) (outlined in Section 2.2), requires Member States to 
define frameworks for independent aggregators along principles that enable full participation in the 
market, currently in GB, independent aggregators can only access some markets directly (i.e. the 
                                                                    
4 A balancing responsible party is a market role in power systems that is specifically defined to settle differences between the 
scheduled and actual values of consumption, generation and trade. 
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ancillary services market and the Capacity Market); whilst other markets can currently only be accessed 
through suppliers (i.e. the Wholesale Market and the Balancing Market).  
Independent aggregators’ relationship with consumers has also been debated in GB, with some calling 
for the relationship to be formalised either through a mandatory Code of Practice or through an 
aggregators licence (BEIS and Ofgem, 2016) (see Section 3.1).  
This briefing paper will look at barriers and opportunities for aggregators in GB, working within the current 
market structure, but it will also look at the wider European context of participation. The Cornwall LEM is 
supportive of aggregators as they can play an important role in selling flexibility in an independent LEM. 
Therefore, barriers faced by aggregators can also affect the performance of a LEM – either directly in that 
in several circumstances they face the same barriers (mostly surrounding access to existing and new 
markets5), or indirectly, in that barriers which undermine the financial potential of aggregators could 
undermine their availability to transact with a LEM. 
  
                                                                    
5 For full details on regulatory and market barriers see our overarching report (Bray, Woodman and Connor, 2018) 
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2. European Context 
2.1 European Markets 
The ability of aggregators to access markets varies across Europe. For example, in Germany, Finland 
and Belgium aggregators currently require contractual agreement with the supplier before they can 
commence any agreement with the consumer. Whilst in France, on the other hand, regulation enables 
aggregators to access all markets without negotiating first with a supplier (PA Consulting Group, 2016). 
A 2017 study of explicit DSR in Europe conducted by the Smart Energy Demand Coalition (SEDC, 2017), 
highlights the range of regulatory procedures currently in operation regarding the access of 
aggregators to European DSR markets6. Figure 1 gives an overview of the development of European 
DSR as of 2017 according to SEDC’s analysis. 
Figure 1:  Demand Response in Europe 
 
Source: (SEDC, 2017) 
Note: SEDC note that they ranked the EU Member States in relation to each other, and that even where countries are shown 
as green on the map, further improvements are both possible and necessary. 
 
Six Member States were identified as ‘green’ in Figure 1, based on the survey findings and a criteria 
tally. Of these six, France achieved the highest score in the survey overall, with a total score of 18 out of 
20. Industrial customers in France have been able to participate in the balancing mechanism since 2003 
and from 2007 aggregated residential load has also been able to participate (ibid). France introduced 
                                                                    
6 Note this particular study only looks at DSR and no other forms of flexibility 
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the NEBEF mechanism in December 2013 which allows curtailed load to bid directly into the Day Ahead 
market, and as of 2017, the Intraday market also. The NEBEF mechanism also regulated and 
standardised the relationship between aggregators and suppliers through an administrative approach 
to compensation (Baker, 2016). France’s Capacity Mechanism (which commenced in 2017) is also open 
to DSR providers (BEUC, 2018).  
We have looked in more detail at the six Member States which SEDC identified as the highest scoring 
i.e. those Member States which were in the green category, with scores ranging from 14 out of 20 
upwards; along with two from the ‘yellow’ category – Germany and Denmark; which whilst they have 
well established energy trading markets have very limited access for independent aggregators to 
compete within these markets. Table 1 below outlines the BRP / aggregator relationship in each 
country; the markets which are open to flexibility, along with any identified market barriers. We have 
ranked the countries in descending order of how we perceive the ease with which independent 
aggregators can operate in these countries and the ease by which they can access individual markets. 
However, it should be noted that although France and Switzerland are presently leading the table, all of 
the remaining countries are currently undertaking improvements which should ease access in the 
longer term. These improvements are either in the form of new regulations, and / or the development 
of industry trials. 
Table 1: Access and Barriers to European Markets 
Country BRP / aggregator 
relationship 
Access to markets Barriers to markets Relevant 
Legislation 
France Aggregators do not need 
prior agreement from BRPs. 
However the BRP -
aggregator adjustment 
mechanism sets 
compensation amounts 
which aggregators must pay 
to BRPs. 
WM, BM, CM and 
ancillary services are 
all open to 
aggregated DSR. 
DSOs are not able to 
contract flexibility for 
constraint management, 
although there are 18 
demonstration projects in 
progress / concluded. 
The NEBEF 
mechanism, 
2013. 
Switzerland There is no BRP/ aggregator 
contract in the balancing 
markets – aggregators’ 
contract directly with the 
TSO and neither the BRP nor 
the aggregator pay imbalance 
fees. However the aggregator 
has to pay the BRP 
compensation for the 
difference in consumed 
energy. 
DSR is active in the 
balancing and 
ancillary services 
markets (since 2013 
when regulatory 
changes removed 
barriers). 
No access to the WM; and 
Switzerland doesn’t have a 
CM. 
Currently there are only 
pilot projects at the DSO 
level looking at congestion 
management. 
Swiss Energy 
Strategy 2050 
Ireland Aggregators don’t need the 
BRPs permission prior to load 
management. 
Neither the BRP nor the 
aggregator is charged for 
imbalances caused by load 
The ancillary market 
opened to DSR in 
2016 under Interim 
Arrangements 
leading up to the 
launch of I-SEM.  
Difficult and expensive 
prequalification procedures 
act as barriers to consumer 
participation. Aggregators 
aren’t able to cushion 
consumers from these 
After several 
delays, I-SEM 
launched on 1 
Oct 2018 
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management as imbalances 
are covered by the TSO. 
Demand side 
participation should 
increase significantly 
through I-SEM due 
to a more diverse 
product range. 
procedures as each 
consumer is treated as if 
they were a large 
generation unit. 
GB7 The BRP / aggregator issue is 
not as yet resolved.  
Ofgem consider that 
aggregators shouldn’t need 
to gain prior consent from 
suppliers (Ofgem, 2017a). 
However at present 
aggregators can only access 
some markets without 
agreement from the supplier, 
whilst other markets are 
closed to participation except 
via a supplier. 
Aggregators can 
participate in the CM 
(although DSR is not 
on a level footing 
with generation). 
They can also access 
most ancillary 
services. 
There is no access for 
independent aggregators 
to the WM or the BM – 
they would currently need 
a supply licence or a 
bilateral agreement with 
the supplier– and then can 
only bid in generation, not 
DSR to the WM. 
Most DNOs are trialling 
flexibility procurement. 
Modification 
P344 to the 
Balancing and 
Settlement 
Code has 
recently been 
adopted and 
should be 
implemented 
in early 2019 
which will 
alleviate 
access to the 
BM.  
Belgium Aggregators to date have 
needed the prior agreement 
of the customers BRP to 
contract with the customer. 
However Belgium’s ‘Energy 
Pact’ 2018 removes this 
obligation.  
The new framework will allow 
aggregators to sign contracts 
for ancillary services with the 
TSO after passing a 
prequalification process. 
Aggregated DSR can 
access ancillary 
services markets. 
No access to the WM for 
DSR. 
Domestic customers 
cannot participate in DSR 
either individually or 
through an aggregator. 
DSOs do not contract 
flexibility but cooperate 
with the TSO to allow 
network consumers to 
participate in DSR -
although the DSO reserves 
the right to block any 
flexibility event without 
notice if there is a capacity 
issue. 
Energy Pact – 
approved by 
ministers 2018 
but not as yet 
implemented 
Finland Independent aggregators can 
only access markets in 
agreement with the 
customers BRP (apart from 
one ancillary service FCR-D). 
There is no specific 
framework governing the 
aggregator / BRP 
relationship. 
DSR and 
aggregation are 
legally possible in all 
markets but 
technical and 
operational 
limitations exist. 
However, FINGRID 
are running pilot 
Limitations include the 
large scale of load 
requirements in some 
markets and BRP 
requirements. 
No DSO procurement of 
flexibility; and the DSO 
National 
Energy and 
Climate 
Strategy 2030 
(published 
2016) 
                                                                    
7 For overview only as GB situation discussed in detail in Section 3 
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BRPs don’t have to pay for 
imbalance as this is settled by 
the TSO. 
projects from 2018 
to develop a new 
model to enable 
independent 
aggregators to 
access the balancing 
markets (FINGRID, 
2018) 
role in controlling flexibility 
is as yet unclear. 
Network tariff is a flat day / 
night rate which 
disincentives day-time 
DSR. 
 
Germany There is no standardised role 
for independent aggregators 
in Germany – requiring 
several contractual 
relationships to be negotiated 
– with the consumer; the 
TSO; the DSO and the 
consumers BRP. 
Balancing market 
and ancillary 
services are open to 
demand response. 
Minimum bids for all 
balancing 
programmes were 
downsized in 2011 & 
2012. 
Draft CM rules allow 
response 
participation in 
principle, but 
aggregation of 
resources is not 
allowed and 
minimum bid size is 
10MW and 
opportunity costs 
are paid for 
generation – not 
demand. 
WM – demand 
response is only 
allowed via the BRP; 
independent 
aggregators cannot 
enter. 
A number of markets are 
closed to demand 
response. 
No market-based 
programmes at the DSO 
level – partly due to DSOs 
incentive regulation 
favouring CAPEX over 
OPEX, hence financially 
better for a DSO to expand 
/ reinforce the network 
rather than procure 
flexibility. 
Network fees incentivise a 
flat consumption rate; 
thereby penalising those 
that provide flexibility. 
Energiewende 
2010 (Energy 
Concept) 
 
Energy 
Package 2011 
(supplements 
to the 
Energiewende) 
Denmark Independent aggregators 
must bilaterally contract with 
the consumers BRP and 
retailer through a prior 
agreement – however, there 
are no independent 
aggregators in Denmark; only 
retailers / BRPs currently 
provide aggregation services. 
In theory demand 
response can enter 
the WM and 
ancillary services 
markets - but this is 
very limited due to 
little demand from 
the TSOs and DSOs. 
Approx. 85% of 
Danish electricity is 
traded on the Nord 
Pool Spot market. 
Payments in WM are too 
low to make a good 
business case. 
Tertiary reserve market has 
a high volume demand of 
10MW. 
Some markets require 
online measurement and 
24-hour service. 
In 2015 published 
Markedsmodel 2.0 with 
Danish Energy 
Agreement for 
2012-2020 
Denmark's 
Energy and 
Climate 
Outlook 2017 
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proposed market reform to 
enable greater flexibility. It 
included 24 
recommendations  – 
leading to Denmark 
modelling  several 
scenarios for the 
integration of aggregators 
(Arentsen et al., 2017). 
Sources:  (SEDC, 2017) (FINGRID, 2018) (Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment of Finland, 2017) (Elia, 2017) (Elexon, 
2017b) (Elexon, 2017a) (Ofgem, 2017a)  (SEMO, 2018) (Swiss Federal Office of Energy, 2018) (RTE, 2013) (IEA, 2013) (IEA, 2017) 
(Danish Energy Agency, 2017) 
2.2 European Policy Position 
Whilst there is at present no coordinated approach across Europe for the inclusion of independent 
aggregators in the energy markets, there is a united view in industry bodies that there is a need for 
further development and that a coordinated approach is necessary, led by the European Commission 
(Engerati, 2016).  
The European Commission appointed the Smart Grids Task Force to provide regulatory 
recommendations for the deployment of flexibility in 2014; which assessed the role of aggregators 
within its remit. Their concluding document in 2015 recommends that: 
 “In order to avoid barriers to entry, an aggregator should never be obliged to negotiate its portfolio 
with the BRP or supplier of a consumer (SGTF, 2015).” 
The European Commission further sought to ratify the role of aggregators across Europe through their 
2016 proposed revision of the Electricity Directive. Their proposal states that: - 
“Member States shall ensure that their regulatory framework encourages the participation of 
aggregators in the retail market and that it contains at least the following elements: (a) the right 
for each aggregator to enter the market without consent from other market participants……(d) 
aggregators shall not be required to pay compensation to suppliers or generators. 
Member States shall ensure access to and foster participation of demand response, including 
through independent aggregators in all organised markets” (European Commission, 2017). 
However on 18 Dec 2017 the European Parliament made amendments to the proposal (European 
Parliament, 2017). The first amendment is positive in that it adds the words ‘wholesale and retail 
markets’ to the first sentence above. At present, aggregators’ ability to access wholesale markets 
differs across the Member States (as highlighted in Table 1 previously), with several countries currently 
denying independent aggregators access to their wholesale markets, including GB. Therefore, the 
additional wording adds emphasis. 
However, the remainder of the amendments regarding aggregators effectively dilute the original 
statements. The original criterion (a) above still stands, but with added new criterion below this; whilst 
criterion (d) regarding compensation has been reversed, so that instead of stating that compensation 
would not be required it now states that suppliers can be compensated for the amount of electricity they 
provide, but which isn’t consumed by their customer during a DSR event:  
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(d) transparent rules and procedures to ensure that market participants are remunerated for the 
energy they actually feed into the system during the demand response period. Where the 
conditions of remuneration are not agreed by market participants, they shall be subject to approval 
by the national regulatory authorities and monitored by the Agency (ibid). 
The issue of compensation is currently the key barrier to be overcome in setting a common framework 
for independent aggregators in Europe. By removing the original wording on compensation, the 
European Parliament have now effectively allowed the argument to continue at the State regulatory 
level for more years to come. Indeed, Member States are finding this the most difficult aspect to 
reconcile as discussed below. 
2.3 The Issue of Compensation for DSR events 
The issue of supplier compensation provides the main source of discord in trying to develop a 
standardised framework for the roles and responsibilities of independent aggregators in relation to 
customers suppliers and the BRP.  
When a customer modifies their energy consumption in response to a call from an aggregator, the 
customer or aggregator is effectively “selling-on” energy in the form of demand response, energy that 
has been purchased in advance by the supplier in anticipation of the customer’s consumption. As the 
retailer cannot bill the customer for energy that is not directly consumed, the supplier can therefore 
face a loss of revenue. This has resulted in demands for suppliers to be compensated for the loss of 
revenue, with compensation being agreed either via negotiation between the supplier and the 
customer / aggregator, or determined via an administered arrangement as happens currently in France 
(Baker, 2016). 
To add clarity: 
• The independent aggregator activates a DSR event within their customer base which changes 
the consumption of electricity in real-time (either more or less electricity is used by the customer 
than has been expected by their supplier). 
• This event is not initiated by the supplier, who has already purchased a set amount of generation 
based on forecast requirements. 
• This renders the forecast incorrect and results in an imbalance between the volumes purchased 
by the supplier and the electricity consumed by its customers. 
• This creates 2 problems - the actual cost of the energy purchased by the supplier which cannot 
now be sold on (if less electricity was consumed than forecast). This additional amount of 
electricity is known as an ‘open energy position’. Plus, an imbalance position for the supplier 
(potentially leading to imbalance fees). 
 
The two main issues to be addressed therefore are: 
1. the open energy position of the Supplier due to a DSR (turn-down8) activation in the energy 
market (the Supplier has purchased energy it now can’t sell) and 
                                                                    
8 Conversely if the DSR is ‘turn-up’ the Supplier will be able to sell additional energy during the event. 
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2. the need to avoid imbalance penalties for the BRP / Supplier of participating consumers during 
a DSR event triggered by an independent aggregator. 
Solutions addressing these two issues need to be found if independent aggregators are to fully emerge 
in European markets. To date no standardised solution has been found; and there are several 
arguments surrounding what should happen in the meantime.  
Eurelectric9 claim that currently independent aggregators are ‘free riders’ in the system whereby 
they re-sell electricity bought by a supplier after curtailing customer load, thus distorting price and 
market competition. They recommend that either the aggregator or the consumer should 
therefore compensate the supplier for the avoided consumption (Edwards, 2017; Eurelectric, 2017). 
The international energy think-tank RAP, however, disagree that compensation should be paid, 
claiming that compensation payments could crush the commercial viability of DSR in the EU. In their 
2016 Policy Brief (Baker, 2016) RAP claim that supplier compensation will severely restrict customer 
participation; thereby reducing the environmental and financial benefits which aggregation could 
provide to the whole energy system. RAP argue that as DSR is of benefit to the whole energy system 
that it should therefore be incentivised rather than penalised. 
RAP continue this line of thinking in their 2017 Policy Brief  (Baker, 2017b) which claims that when 
downward demand response (turn-down) is initiated this in fact reduces wholesale prices, meaning that 
suppliers have access to cheaper electricity, allowing them considerable savings when purchasing 
energy for their customers. 
RAP outline that demands for direct compensation should be rejected on two counts (Baker, 2017b). 
Firstly, in that it poses a significant threat to incentivised demand response and the associated system 
and financial benefits to be gained by this. Secondly, they propose that there is a simpler solution, by 
allowing suppliers to retain a percentage of the wholesale savings made during a demand response 
event. RAP claim that as everyone benefits from these reduced wholesale prices it is fairer for all to 
share in the benefits, rather than penalising aggregators for instigating the situation (Baker, 2016).  
RAP conducted analysis on the French, German-Austrian, and Nordic spot markets over the years 
2013/14, 2014/15, and 2015/16 using actual day-ahead price data for the three markets. Their analysis 
identified that: 
 “By reducing demand during periods when capacity is scarce and wholesale prices are high, 
demand response reduces overall market costs thereby benefiting all consumers in the form of 
lower electricity bills, not just those who participate. Analysis suggests that even a modest 
application of demand response could generate savings of up to €1.6 billion annually across the 
German/Austrian, Nordic, and French electricity markets alone, with greater savings expected 
across Europe as a whole” (Baker, 2017a). 
                                                                    
9 Eurelectric are a sector association which represents the interests of the electricity industry at pan-European level 
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The Smart Energy Demand Coalition (SEDC) however, claim that RAP’s model would not be a practical 
or legitimate European solution10. They state that there is however an urgent need to create an EU-
wide aggregator model, but a model based on the principles that: 
• The open energy position is settled between the independent aggregator and the BRP/Supplier, i.e. 
the aggregator will buy the sourced but not consumed energy from the BRP/Supplier in case of 
demand curtailment (turn-down) or will sell the consumed but not sourced energy in case of 
demand enhancement (turn-up) to the BRP. 
• This will:  
 Provide fair payment to the BRP for the open energy position and 
 Correct the balance position of the BRP avoiding any imbalance penalties due to the DSR event 
independently of the imbalance settlement rules in place 
• The adjustment mechanism should be applicable and symmetric for both demand curtailment 
(turn-down) and demand enhancement (turn-up). 
• The adjustment mechanism should be centrally facilitated and not require the independent 
aggregator to contract directly with the BRP, which creates a conflict of interest between parties. 
Without a central facilitation, dedicated aggregation services are not possible, because if the 
Supplier/BRP does not agree to the fair terms of the contract no services can be provided. 
• Any communication of information between the BRP and independent aggregator should be 
centralized in order to avoid confidentiality and competition issues (SEDC, 2015). 
This would appear to provide a pragmatic solution to the issues raised.  On the one hand aggregators 
would need to pay suppliers the open energy cost; however, on the other hand, they could gain easier 
and quicker access to the energy markets.  By removing the requirement for aggregators to hold prior 
contracts with suppliers; and by removing the communication / competition issues between 
aggregators and suppliers; this effectively gives aggregators the legitimate platform they need to 
establish a robust business proposition. 
However, it is difficult to assess the exact open energy cost as individual suppliers will adopt different 
hedging strategies and purchase energy in different timescales. This means that negotiating 
compensation between the supplier and the customer or aggregator will be difficult as this 
“information gap” places the retailer in a very dominant negotiating position.  
                                                                    
10 No argument is provided by SEDC as to why they conclude this 
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2.4 European Aggregator Models 
Ongoing work has been undertaken in an attempt to create an EU-wide aggregator model. In this 
respect, USEF11 developed an Aggregator Workstream in 2016 (USEF, 2018) to investigate ways to 
standardise the roles of aggregators across Europe; with an aim of increasing their participation across 
all relevant markets. The Workstream consisted of Transmission System Operators (TSOs), DSOs, 
suppliers, aggregators and BRPs from across Europe, with an initial focus on four differing European 
markets – Belgium, Denmark, Germany and The Netherlands.  
The workstream analysed the different topics related to the aggregator role with particular focus on the 
relationship between the aggregator and the BRP/Supplier. This resulted in a list of ‘complexities’ that 
the Aggregator Workstream determined need to be resolved:  
• Measurement and validation - ensuring correct and trustworthy data. 
• Baseline methodology – how to define appropriate baseline methodologies, roles and 
responsibilities?  
• Information exchange and confidentiality - finding a balance between transparency and 
confidentiality. 
• Transfer of energy price methodology - how to compensate the position of the Prosumer’s supplier 
and its BRP? 
• Relationship between implicit and explicit demand response - how to separate both impacts 
unambiguously. 
• Rebound effect - can the BRP or Supplier be negatively impacted and if so, how can this be 
compensated?  
• Portfolio conditions - how to participate in TSO/DSO/BRP products through a portfolio? 
 
Emerging from those complexities the Aggregator Workstream developed a set of seven different 
aggregator models which could be implemented across any of the European Member States (see 
Figure 2), but the Foundation claim that there is no ‘best single model’ and that the model selected by 
Member States should be based on what works best for their individual market (Engerati, 2016) thus 
delegating responsibility back to national authorities to deliver regulatory frameworks for aggregators. 
The seven models show nuances of the arguments introduced in the previous section (RAP – Net 
Benefit model;  Eurelectric - Broker model and Contractual model; SEDC – Central Settlement model) ; 
proving the ongoing complexity that has been created by trying to retrospectively fit the aggregator 
role within existing market structures. 
  
                                                                    
11 The Universal Smart Energy Framework (USEF) is an independent Dutch organisation which provides non-association 
regulatory recommendations to the European Commission via the Smart Grids Task Force. www.usef.energy  
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Figure 2: USEF's 7 models for aggregators in Europe 
 
 
Source: (USEF, 2016) 
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3. GB Context 
3.1 GB Overview 
There are currently nineteen Commercial Aggregation companies listed on National Grid’s website12, of 
which six companies hold a supply licence (supplier-aggregators) whilst four other companies work in 
partnership with a licenced supplier; leaving nine stand-alone aggregation service companies. 
BEIS and Ofgem commissioned and published several reports in recent years which examine the 
benefits which independent aggregators can bring to the GB electricity markets; both financially and in 
terms of system-wide benefit (BEIS and Ofgem, 2016, 2017; PA Consulting Group, 2016; CRA, 2017). 
All of these studies agreed that independent aggregators provide an important route to market for DSR 
and flexibility providers, with the report from the PA Consulting Group highlighting that 74% of their 
survey respondents who provided DSR did so through an independent aggregator13. Further, CRA’s 
economic assessment estimated that the value of DSR participation in the Balancing Market could be in 
the region of £110mn to £400mn by 2020 (CRA, 2017) if entry was enabled. 
However, despite the acknowledgement of the role which independent aggregators can play, several 
previously independent aggregators in GB have taken the decision to become licensed suppliers due to 
the barriers in place in accessing several GB markets. Erik Nygard, CEO of the supplier-aggregator 
Limejump believes that aggregators without a supply licence will struggle to survive (Coyne, 2017c); 
whilst Alastair Martin of  Flexitricity, states that Flexitricity came to the decision to apply for a supply 
licence in 2017 due to the long delays anticipated in finalising and implementing amendments to the 
Balancing and Settlement Code which would ease access to the markets (Flexitricity, 2018) (see Section 
3.2.3). 
The CRA economic assessment also highlights a number of other concerns raised by independent 
aggregators. These include Capacity Market regulations, the organisation of energy markets and a 
general lack of customer understanding combined with a reticence to risk compromising core business 
activities through load interruptions (CRA, 2017). Indeed a previous survey conducted by Ofgem noted 
that 71% of companies in the industrial, commercial and public sectors don’t participate in DSR due to a 
lack of customer understanding and difficulty in navigating separate markets (Ofgem, 2016b). 
The ESO (National Grid) are facilitating the ‘Power Responsive’ programme (National Grid, 2017a) to 
stimulate increased participation in DSR by 2020. One of the outcomes for the programme will be to 
ensure that DSR has equal opportunity with supply in contributing to balancing the system. To date 
Power Responsive has been focused on I&C customers only, but it will also involve the smaller non-
domestic and domestic sector in the near future.  
BEIS & Ofgem further acknowledged some of the barriers facing aggregators in their ‘Call for Evidence’ 
and the subsequent ‘Smart Systems and Flexibility Plan’ (BEIS and Ofgem, 2017). Additionally, Ofgem 
added further detail in their Open Letter (Ofgem, 2017a) published alongside the Smart Systems and 
Flexibility Plan. This included the consideration that “market arrangements should enable aggregators, 
                                                                    
12 https://www.nationalgrideso.com/balancing-services/demand-side-response-dsr  
13 This % is likely to have decreased with independent aggregators such as Flexitricity taking up supply licences in order to be 
able to trade across all markets 
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including independent aggregators, to access additional energy markets where they can be accommodated 
efficiently.” This is welcomed as a policy intent but it still raises questions over what is considered 
‘efficient’ as there is no clarification given on how this will be assessed. 
In addition, Paul Troughton of Enernoc (now known as Enel X), expressed concerns over Ofgem’s 
statement that “payments for sold on energy may be most efficiently agreed in the retail contract terms 
between the supplier and the consumer” (ibid). Troughton stated that “we would be much happier with a 
rule that avoided the possibility of the supplier using such terms (or other retail contract clauses) to deter 
their customers from working with independent aggregators…For example, Ofgem could simply provide 
guidance that the transfer price of any demand response energy should be the retail price less any levies 
and network tariffs”(Coyne, 2017a). 
Ofgem’s proposal differs to the EU-wide target model proposed by SEDC (Section 2.4 above) which 
promotes a centralised system for handling adjustments and communication in order to preserve 
confidentiality and increase competition between market actors. 
Independent aggregators’ relationship with consumers has also been debated in GB, with some calling 
for the relationship to be formalised either through a mandatory Code of Practice or through an 
aggregators licence (BEIS and Ofgem, 2016).  
To aid with clarification, the Association for Decentralised Energy (ADE) launched a consultation into 
the development of a ‘DSR Code of Conduct’ in July 2017 (ADE, 2017) with the intent to provide 
assurance to market participants by setting standards which aggregators can (voluntarily) agree to. The 
Code of Conduct was published in November 2018 for launch in early 2019 (ADE, 2018a) when 
aggregators will be able to sign-up to it under a scheme membership agreement called ‘Flex Assure’. 
Flex Assure seeks to establish a common set of minimum standards by which customers can compare 
aggregators; focussing on five specific areas of concern – sales and marketing; technical due diligence 
(cybercrime and data protection); pre-contractual information; contracts and complaints procedures.  
The Code of Conduct is intended to initially apply to non-domestic DSR customers only, but it will be 
revisited in due course to assess whether it can be extended to the domestic level also. BEIS & Ofgem 
have stated that they will monitor the code of conduct before deciding whether further measures are 
necessary (BEIS and Ofgem, 2017; Ofgem, 2017a). 
GB aggregators appear to welcome the introduction of the Code of Conduct; indeed many have been 
involved in its design and content (ADE, 2018b). Signing up to Flex Assure enables them to uphold their 
claims of integrity and transparency in undertaking DSR on clients’ behalf; and gives them professional 
recognition. However, barriers to their participation in certain GB markets still persist as discussed in 
Section 3.2.  
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3.2 GB National Markets 
3.2.1 Ancillary Services 
The ancillary services markets currently provide the strongest opportunity in GB for independent 
aggregators to participate (PA Consulting Group, 2016). Aggregators are active in enabling the 
participation of small, individual loads which individually wouldn’t meet the larger bid sizes, thereby 
increasing the level of participation by small generators. Aggregators don’t need prior permission from 
suppliers to enter these markets and they can aggregate small loads from across the country (SEDC, 
2017) providing reliability benefits through diversity.  
In 2016 the ESO only procured 6% of its ancillary services through demand side measures (PA 
Consulting Group, 2016) although National Grid have an ambition to increase this to 30-50% by 2020 
(BEIS and Ofgem, 2016). 
In an attempt to remedy this situation National Grid launched their ‘Product Roadmap for Frequency 
Response and Reserve’ in December 2017 (National Grid, 2017b) in response to consultation with 
stakeholders in early 2017 (National Grid, 2017d). The consultation highlighted that the vast range of 
ancillary services products, each with differing technical specifications and timelines for procurement, 
had acted as a deterrent to flexibility providers (BEIS and Ofgem, 2016). 
The Roadmap therefore sets out National Grid’s first steps towards rationalising and simplifying their 
products, with an aim of making services easier for flexibility providers to access. To this end, tenders 
for short-term requirements will now be held on a monthly basis, with longer-term requirements held 
on a quarterly basis. In addition, trial auctions will also commence in June 2019 (National Grid, 2018a) 
and exclusivity clauses will be reviewed (National Grid, 2018b). Exclusivity clauses previously dampened 
the market by not allowing providers to stack revenue from multiple products and services; thus 
reducing revenue capacity.  
National Grid further announced in June 2018 that they had achieved over 50% of their ancillary 
services by demand side measures in the preceding month (Coyne, 2018a). If this trend continues it 
may be the case therefore that National Grid have achieved their target two years in advance, which 
will mean significant progress for aggregators who participate in these markets. 
3.2.2 Capacity Market 
The participation of aggregators in the Capacity Market (CM) has been important in enabling the 
participation of individual DSR and storage providers who would not meet the minimum capacity 
requirement on their own14 and indeed most of the awarded DSR CM contracts have been negotiated 
via aggregators (Business Green, 2018).  
The 2016/17 T-4 auction was the first time that battery storage had agreements awarded (around 
500MW at a clearance price of £22.50 per kW) and although DSR saw significant growth;  storage and 
DSR still accounted for only 6.11% and 2.69% respectively (National Grid, 2017c).  
                                                                    
14 The minimum capacity required to participate in the main CM auctions is 2 MW and for the TA auctions it was 500kW (CRA, 
2017). 
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However in the 2017/18 T-4 auction, only 153MW of battery storage capacity was contracted, due to 
developers unwilling or unable to accept contracts at the extremely low clearance price of £8.40 per 
kW; whilst DSR contracts stayed relatively stable at 1.2GW (Business Green, 2018). 
The individual auction results are provided in Table 2 below: 
Table 2: CM Auction Results 
Auction Delivery Year DSR All Storage (incl. battery) Clearing price 
per kW per 
year 
2014/15 T4 2018/ 19 174 MW 0.35% 2699 MW 5.48% £19.40 
2015 / 16 T4 2019/ 20 476 MW 1.03% 2617 MW 5.65% £18.00 
2016/ 17 T4 2020/ 21 1410 MW 2.69% 3201 MW 6.11% £22.50 
2017/ 18 T4 2021/ 22 1207 MW 2.39% 2680 MW 5.32% £8.40 
2015/16 TA 2016/17 803 MW N/A N/A N/A £27.50 
2016/17 TA 2017/18 312 MW N/A N/A N/A £45.00 
2017/18 T1 2018/19 443 MW 7.65% 104 MW 1.8% £6.00 
Source: EMR Delivery Body, collated from respective Final Auction Results Documents 
Despite the addition of the two Transitional Arrangements (TA) auctions in 2015/16 and 2016/17 which 
were designed specifically to support DSR involvement, several issues have been identified with 
participation (CRA, 2017). Most of these are in relation to perceived discrimination when comparing 
DSR with generation.  
Firstly, DSR providers are currently only awarded one-year contracts in the CM (as opposed to the 3-
year and 15-year contracts available for refurbished generation and new-build generation respectively). 
This has been seen as a principal concern of aggregators as it can affect their access to finance (CRA, 
2017). Until the present day, there have been no provisions to amend the Capacity Market Rules in 
order to extend contract periods as this would necessitate changes to State Aid (PA Consulting Group, 
2016). The Tempus Ruling (see below) however, could now change this. 
Secondly, CM Rules didn’t originally allow for the stacking of contracts between the CM and the 
ancillary services products. This potentially reduced the profitability of DER as stacking enables access 
to several different revenue streams simultaneously. However, BEIS and Ofgem responded positively 
to this barrier in the 2017 ‘Smart Systems and Flexibility Plan’ by stating that they would allow stacking 
to occur in future (BEIS and Ofgem, 2017). Ofgem have also committed to make changes to allow DSR 
providers to reallocate their assets in the CM ahead of pre-qualification as of 2019 (BEIS and Ofgem, 
2018). 
Thirdly, CM payments are based on availability (capacity) payments and also on activation (generation) 
payments. However, DSR does not receive an activation payment as its role within the CM is to reduce 
demand rather than to supply additional generation. Therefore, it is claimed that: 
 “Independently-aggregated DSR is the only resource in the CM which does not receive an 
energy payment. This increases the minimum capacity price at which it can viably be offered – 
as it must cover all its energy costs from its capacity revenue – putting it at a unique 
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disadvantage when bidding in auctions, and leading to less DSR clearing than would be 
economically optimal.” (SEDC, 2017) 
Additionally, DSR providers were not able to participate in both the TA auction and the T-4 auction for 
the same year, leaving providers having to guess which one to enter to achieve the best price. 
Tempus Energy Ruling 
In December 2014, the demand-side company Tempus Energy took out a legal challenge to the General 
Court of the European Union stating that the CM design was unlawful under State Aid rules because of 
its treatment of DSR (Lockwood, 2017). Tempus’ claim included that: 
• the Commission failed to properly assess the potential role of DSR in the UK capacity market; 
• the restrictions on the duration of DSR contracts under the capacity market (1 year) violate the 
principles of legitimate expectation and non-discrimination; 
• the requirement for DSR operators to choose between transitional and enduring market 
auctions violates the principles of legitimate expectation and non-discrimination; 
• the capacity market’s cost recovery methodology violates the principles of non-discrimination, 
legitimate expectation and proportionality; 
• the use of open-ended capacity events rather than time-bound ones in the enduring auctions of 
the capacity market is contrary to the principles of non-discrimination and legitimate 
expectation; 
• the capacity market’s bid bond requirement to obtain access to the auctions violates the 
principles of non-discrimination and legitimate expectation; and 
• the capacity market’s failure to provide for additional remuneration for savings in transmission 
and distribution losses from DSR violates the principles of non-discrimination and legitimate 
expectation (EUR-Lex, 2014). 
 
The Case was heard in July 2017 and on 15 November 2018 the European Court of Justice found in 
favour of Tempus and removed its State Aid approval, ruling that the European Commission had not 
properly considered the role of DSR when it granted approval in 2014 (European Court of Justice, 2018). 
The decision led to BEIS immediately suspending the CM and withholding payments to agreement 
holders, causing share prices in all participating companies to fall rapidly (Reed, 2018). Unfortunately, 
the ruling will cause short-term financial difficulty to all participants (including DSR participants) and 
some suggest it could cause further uncertainty across energy flexibility markets until a resolution has 
been achieved (Coyne, 2018b).  
Longer-term however, the resolution should force BEIS to redesign the CM to allow an equal footing 
between generation and DSR, which aggregators have long argued for. It is hoped that this will afford 
BEIS and Ofgem the opportunity to finally resolve all outstanding issues with the treatment of DSR in 
the CM, but it is too early to tell how far-reaching any new proposals will be. 
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3.2.3 Wholesale Market and Balancing Market 
Independent aggregators currently do not have direct access to the Wholesale Market (WM) and the 
Balancing Mechanism (Ofgem, 2017a) which is placing small embedded generators at a disadvantage 
to larger generation assets. 
There are currently two routes of entry for small generators to the WM: -  
• Central Volume Allocation (CVA) agreements which allows generators to access the market 
directly, and 
• Supplier Volume Allocation (SVA) agreements which involve partnering with a licensed supplier, via 
a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) i.e. indirectly. 
The CVA route is particularly difficult for small generators to enter directly due to the volumes required 
by the ESO, administrative costs (including running a 24-hour trading desk) and compliance with 
electricity licensing codes. Costs include: 
• Accession Form 
• £500 Accession Fee 
• Accession Agreement 
• Authorized signatories (BSCP38/5.1 and Director’s letter) 
• Order Communications Line Request  
• CVA Testing  
• Funds Accession Form BSCP301/04a  
• Credit Contacts 
• Party Registration (BSCP65/01) 
• Party Agent Registration (BSCP71/05) 
• BM Unit Registration (BSCP15/4.1) 
• £250 per month BSC membership fee 
• £100 per month BMU registration fee 
Source: Elexon 2017 (prices correct as of Dec 2017) 
The SVA route is therefore much easier for small generators to access but partnering currently has to 
be through a licensed supplier in order to be able to access the WM and the Balancing Mechanism. This 
is one of the reasons why several independent aggregators have had to take the decision to become 
licensed suppliers. 
If independent aggregators were able to access the WM this would ease both costs and risks for the 
smaller generators, due to the fact that aggregators could pool the costs across their portfolio of 
generators whilst also being responsible for operating a trading desk.  
However, the greatest financial asset of aggregation in the WM could be realised through minimizing 
the risk of facing imbalance fees (should the generator not be able to fulfil its traded volume at gate 
closure) or the cost of buying any additional generation volume from a third party (in order to fulfil the 
requirement at gate closure). This is a particular challenge for intermittent technologies such as solar 
and wind.  
Aggregation could therefore help to cushion forecasting errors by these generators, as aggregators 
could mutualise between multiple generators across different locations. This is known as the ‘diversity 
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effect’; essentially meaning that forecasting errors for different areas are likely to compensate for each 
other; thereby lowering uncertainties and risk (Garcia-Rundstadler, 2018). 
Smaller generators are also disadvantaged in the Balancing Mechanism. The ESO has operational 
issues with despatching smaller plants (Elexon, 2017c) thereby lessening the opportunities for them to 
participate. However, under current regulations, smaller generators are unable to aggregate generation 
from multiple sites into a single Balancing Mechanism Unit (BMU), making it difficult for them to 
compete with larger power stations in the Balancing Market (BM).  
Additionally, there is no provision in the design of the BM for explicit DSR. In practice it can only be 
provided by the supplier of the DSR-provider. This is because there is no mechanism for making bids 
and offers for a customer’s potential demand, since there is no baselining of a customer’s demand 
against which such bids/offers may be assessed in order to monitor delivery. This means that 
independent aggregators are not currently able to register BMUs and thereby participate (CRA, 2017). 
As a result, DSR is limited to provision by suppliers that may activate DSR in their customers or via 
aggregators who sell to suppliers.  
However, European balancing project TERRE has indirectly eased access to the BM for smaller 
generators and DSR providers, by requiring modifications to the Balancing and Settlement Code (BSC) 
in order for GB to comply with Project TERRE requirements.  
Project TERRE (Trans European Replacement Reserves Exchange) is a pilot initiative set up by the 
European Network of Transmission System Operators (ENTSO-E) to tackle issues regarding the 
procurement, exchange and settlement of balancing energy across a large area of Western Europe 
(including GB).  
TERRE will establish and operate a multi-TSO platform that can gather all bids for Replacement 
Reserves (RR) and can optimise the allocation of RR across the systems of the different TSOs.  
TERRE requirements state that “DSR must be allowed to compete on a level playing field with 
traditional flexibility providers” and the TERRE concept should allow smaller generators access to the 
BM. 
Modification P344 seeks to align the BSC with Project TERRE requirements to allow the 
implementation of the project at national level and be compliant with the first tranche of obligations 
in the European Network Codes.  
Source: (AAMHE et al., 2016). 
Modification P344 (Elexon, 2017a) to the BSC seeks to align the BSC with TERRE requirements in order 
for TERRE to be implemented in December 2019 (after initial slippage from 2018). P344 introduces the 
concept of a Virtual Lead Party (VLP) which can register Secondary BM Units and hold a Virtual 
Balancing Account. As the VLP wouldn’t need to be a BRP, this role can be fulfilled by independent 
aggregators once the Modification is implemented in 2019.  
This Modification is welcomed by industry (Coyne, 2017c) but Erik Nygard, CEO of the supplier-
aggregator Limejump believes that aggregators without a supply licence will struggle to survive in the 
meantime (ibid) whilst Alastair Martin, the Chief Strategy Officer of  Flexitricity, states that although 
the introduction of P344  should eventually alleviate access problems; due to the long delay anticipated 
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in finalisation and implementation, Flexitricity came to the decision to apply for a supply licence in 2017 
(Flexitricity, 2018). 
Now that Flexitricity have changed their position from being an independent aggregator to be a 
supplier-aggregator they are now seeking to bid their customers DSR into the BM as of October 2018 as 
this is where the most profit can be made. Alastair Martin points out that prices in the BM can reach 
£2,500 per MWh, compared to around £50 per MWh in wholesale markets. He also believes that with 
the development of the ‘Western bootstrap’15 which will relieve congestion from Scottish wind 
generation, that this will lead to additional balancing being required by the ESO in the near future in 
order to be able to manage the additional peaks and troughs that could arise (ibid). 
Meanwhile Limejump recently became the first company to trade an aggregated unit in the BM, and 
the first to trade batteries in the market. Its 168 MW virtual power plant (VPP) was the first BMU to be 
aggregated across multiple grid supply points (GSP). The VPP was able to enter the BM after Ofgem 
granted a derogation from certain Grid Code requirements, enabling BMU data to be aggregated at the 
GSP group level. This derogation is specific to Limejump, however Ofgem recently approved Grid Code 
modification GC0097, which will allow other suppliers to do the same (Porter, 2018). 
There is therefore much positive movement happening in the BM which will eventually greatly ease 
access for independent aggregators. However, they are currently missing out on these lucrative 
revenue streams until P344 is implemented.  
  
                                                                    
15 The Western Link or ‘Bootstrap’ is a 239-mile subsea cable from Ayrshire to the Wirral to export surplus wind generation 
from Scotland 
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3.3 Local Flexibility Markets 
3.3.1 DNO Flexibility Markets 
The changing role of the DNOs can be seen as one of the most critical factors determining whether, and 
how, small generators and DER providers are able to access new revenue streams and localised 
markets. 
Until recently the DNOs have been seen as largely ‘passive’ in their operations – facilitating the one-
way flow of electricity from the transmission network to the consumer. However, the amount of 
generation in GB that is connected at the distribution level (rather than the transmission level) has 
doubled over the last five years (Ofgem, 2017b) and now represents around 30% of total GB installed 
capacity, at 30,838 MW as of December 2017 (ONS, 2018).  
However, distribution networks were not originally designed to accommodate generation and resulting 
bi-directional power flows, and therefore this increase in distributed generation has impacted on the 
DNOs in several ways, creating challenges in network management, with local networks experiencing 
severe strain at peak times (Ramos et al., 2016; WPD, 2017a). 
To meet the needs of this more decentralised future energy system, the GB DNOs are beginning to 
commence a transition to becoming DSOs – distribution system operators. The rationale for this 
transition is that with the increasing amount of generation connected at the network level, rather than 
at the transmission level; and with the further emergence of new technologies, heat pumps and EVs at 
the domestic level; the DNO will increasingly have a greater need to forecast and actively manage 
energy flows across the network. This could lead to the DSO replicating at the distribution level the 
system balancing functions which the TSO currently undertakes at the transmission level (Nolan, 2015).  
It seems likely that a DSO will be expected to match generation and supply locally, and to facilitate 
competitive local trading markets as part of enabling this (ENA, 2017; WPD, 2017b) which would open 
up new revenue streams for aggregators to trade in. However, the balance between what the DSOs will 
operate themselves and what they will procure from the market is still to be determined. The Energy 
Networks Association (ENA) is leading on the ‘Open Networks Project’ which is advising on DNO to 
DSO transitions, as well as the future coordination scheme for the TSO and the DSOs in the 
procurement and dispatch of DER. The coordination scheme which is eventually chosen will not only 
determine the responsibilities of the system operators towards each other but will also determine their 
responsibilities towards third parties (e.g. aggregators, LEMs, DER providers etc.) (Hancher and 
Winters, 2017). 
The ENA issued a consultation document in July 2018 entitled  ‘Future Worlds’ (ENA, 2018) which gives 
an overview of five different scenarios which might be used for the procurement and dispatch of DER 
services as shown in Table 3. The ENA point out that they don’t expect any one of the Future Worlds to 
be chosen as the final option, but they have set out what each ‘world’ would look like so that consultees 
are able to choose the characteristics which they feel should apply in any eventual model and also to be 
able to assess any barriers across the different models. 
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Table 3 ENA’s Five Future World Models 
Future Worlds Description Analysis 
World A  
DSO 
Coordinates 
The DSO acts as the neutral 
facilitator for all DER and 
provides services on a 
locational basis to the ESO. 
 
This model would entail the DSOs managing the entire GB 
network, which they currently have no visibility of. Systems 
would need to be put in place to ensure smooth 
transactions between the DSOs and the ESO, but the DSOs 
should be in a better position to understand their own 
areas needs and constraints and this model would achieve 
granularity at the local level. However, this model runs the 
risk of DSOs becoming ‘regional aggregators’ and of 
conflict in DER being able to access ESO markets such as 
the BM. 
Worryingly, all the Future Worlds show DSOs owning and 
operating flexibility resources; which is a clear conflict of 
interest in neutral market facilitation; as well as being in 
conflict with the Smart Systems and Flexibility Plan which 
states that DSOs shouldn’t own and operate storage. 
World B  
Coordinated 
DSO-ESO 
The DSO and ESO work 
together to efficiently 
manage networks through 
coordinated procurement 
and dispatch of flexibility 
resources. 
 
Although complex, this could be the most effective model 
longer term once the operating platform between the DSO 
and ESO is established as it should best enable local assets 
to access multiple markets – locally and nationally. There 
needs to be transparency in decision-making though as 
there will inevitably be conflicts of prioritisation between 
the DSO and the ESO. 
World C  
Price-Driven 
Flexibility 
Changes developed through 
Ofgem’s reform of 
electricity access and 
forward-looking charges 
have improved access 
arrangements and forward-
looking signals for 
customers.  
This isn’t a stand-alone world but can be overlaid across any 
of the other 4 worlds. This was added at Ofgem’s request. 
The EPG is not in agreement with Ofgem’s proposals for 
reforming electricity access and forward-looking charges 
as we think it financially penalises DER providers and risks 
network flight as per our consultation response.16 
World D  
ESO 
Coordinates 
The ESO is the counterparty 
for DER with DSOs 
informing the ESO of their 
requirements. 
 
This may be the most conventional model and easiest to 
implement in the short term due to the ESO’s existing 
procurement, call-off and settlement processes already 
being in place. It also means that one organisation is 
procuring / dispatching on a nationwide basis, rather than 6 
DSOs procuring separately for their own needs. However, 
it is a top down approach and may not include the 
granularity anticipated for full DER market availability. It is 
the opposite of World A and so therefore has the opposite 
issue – DER could be restricted in accessing DSO markets. 
 
                                                                    
16 http://projects.exeter.ac.uk/igov/submission-ofgem-electricity-network-access-and-charging/  
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World E   
Flexibility 
Coordinators 
A new national (or 
potentially regional) third-
party acts as the neutral 
facilitator for DER providing 
efficient services to the ESO 
and / or DSO as required. 
This is the least conventional model, requiring a new 
market actor or actors to coordinate between the ESO and 
the DSOs. There are issues to be addressed around 
whether the Flexibility Co-ordinator (FC) would become a 
monopoly decision maker, and therefore a very powerful 
new market actor. Therefore, to be a neutral actor the FC 
should not control assets in the same way that the ESO and 
DSOs should not. However, it is unclear whether the FC 
would fulfil an arbitrator role in managing conflicts; or 
whether it would be a rule-based software platform with 
defined processes. 
Source: (ENA, 2018) Analysis includes insights from (Centrica, 2018; Elexon, 2018; Piclo, 2018) 
The Future Worlds consultation closed in September 2018 and at the present time the ENA are 
progressing independent impact assessments on the Future Worlds through Baringa. 
In anticipation of a much wider remit in the procurement of flexibility (whichever World is eventually 
implemented) many of the DNOs are currently undertaking trial flexibility projects, funded through the 
Network Innovation Allowance (NIA) or the Network Innovation Competition (NIC) implemented 
through RIIO. For instance WPD are conducting ‘Flexible Power’ to bid DSR into the ancillary services 
market, as well as using capacity to manage local constraints (Coyne, 2017d). As of January 2018, WPD 
had contracted 70 MW of power from across 50 sites in the East Midlands17. Meanwhile Electricity North 
West are running ‘Project CLASS’ which provides demand turn-down through voltage control and UK 
Power Networks have tendered for an  estimated  37.6 MW of flexibility in 2018/19, rising  to 40.2 MW in 
2019/2020 (UKPN, 2017).  
Whilst these DNO projects could open up new opportunities for aggregators to trade in, there is also 
scope for them to undermine the role which aggregators perform in the market. There is already a 
perceived threat by some aggregators that by DNOs procuring flexibility themselves - either to use for 
constraint management, or to bid into National Grid services – that there is potential to squeeze the 
aggregator position out of the market by misuse of DNOs monopoly powers, as highlighted in World A 
above. 
Several aggregators voiced their concerns in an interview with The Energyst in September 2017, 
claiming that DNO involvement in flexibility trials was anticompetitive. For instance UK Power 
Reserve’s Ian Tanner suggested that “some of the DNOs are almost trying to create ‘nationalised’ 
aggregators within their regions” potentially locking out commercial aggregators (Coyne, 2017b). 
The DNOs are quick to affirm that these trials are just that – trials to find out how flexibility markets will 
work in practice with an aim of adding more value into the markets  (Coyne, 2017b). Currently under 
monopoly licence conditions DNOs need derogations from Ofgem to undertake these trials. In 
addition, they are only able to earn up to 1% of revenue from de minimis reward services so there are 
caveats in place to protect abuse of power.  However, arguments remain that the concept of DNO 
involvement undermines market competition and raises many questions on the extent and control of 
DNOs in the marketplace (ibid).  
                                                                    
17 Interview with WPD 16/01/18 
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3.3.2 Flexibility Platforms 
One emerging approach to bringing more flexibility into the marketplace is through the development 
of commercial online platforms; which act as a third-party in bringing together DER providers and 
market opportunities (likened by Georgiopoulos of UKPN as ‘online dating for DSOs and DERs’) (Pratt, 
2018).  
The online platform approach to flexibility procurement could be utilised whichever Future World is 
determined, although the scope of opportunities could differ under each World i.e. World A could offer 
more local opportunities; whereas World D could offer more national opportunities. It is unclear 
whether such a platform could become a Flexibility Coordinator under World E; and indeed, the current 
remit of these platforms isn’t to control assets or act as a BRP; but rather to act as a gateway which 
local DER assets can use for signalling availability, responding to flexibility tenders and coordinating 
dispatch. 
However, will flexibility platforms further squeeze the role of aggregators out of the marketplace, or 
will they provide new opportunities for aggregators to trade in?  Current thoughts are that flexibility 
platforms and aggregators are mutually beneficial as in the case of the Cornwall LEM. 
The Cornwall LEM 
The Cornwall LEM flexibility platform, launched in June 2018, offers a varied suite of market 
opportunities for flexibility and generation assets with an aim of enabling a more efficient market for 
local assets that gives them access to local and national flexibility markets. WPD are a partner in the 
project and are assisting in the design, testing and trial of the platform. 
WPD signal their flexibility requirements on the platform, which local assets can then bid for. The 
platform is also used for the arming and dispatching of services and supporting the processes for 
validation of service delivery and settlement.  The information on the platform can also be used for 
notifications between parties to reduce any negative impact that one party’s use of flexibility services 
may have on another (WPD, 2018).  
The LEM platform also enables access to ESO level opportunities as well as local opportunities. As part 
of the Cornwall LEM trial, Centrica is also trialling blockchain-based P2P trading with its partner LO3 
Energy.  
The ultimate aim of the Cornwall LEM is to release network capacity as a result of more intelligent 
management of demand, generation and storage; particularly in constrained areas of the grid. It 
incentivises participants to turn up, down, export or import to help optimise local capacity and to 
(hopefully) enable further renewable resources to connect to the grid in areas that were previously 
considered to be constrained.  
Independent aggregators can also play an important role within the Cornwall LEM, by submitting local 
generation and flexibility assets to the LEM platform to help with this coordination of local congestion 
management. The LEM platform in return provides aggregators with more opportunities to participate 
and a clear overview of what flexibility is require
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“Being able to see clearly what the network companies need means that when we go to customers, 
we know that what we’re inviting them into is something they can benefit from.  We can figure out 
what the customers can do, how, when and at what cost.”18 
 
Piclo Flex 
The remaining five GB DNOs are currently using, or will shortly be using19, the Piclo Flex online platform 
(developed by Open Utility) to announce their flexibility tenders.  
The Piclo Flex platform currently only deals with flexibility, not generation per se. Whilst the scope of 
the platform may evolve over time to include generation, the current remit is to enable DNOs to 
signpost their future flexibility requirements, and for providers to register on the platform in order to 
notify the DNO of their availability – by technology type; location on the network and price. The 
platform therefore acts as the market place for signalling these tender opportunities and for providers, 
including aggregators, to submit offers.   
Open Utility undertook a Flexibility Marketplace consultation with providers (including independent 
aggregators) in November 2017 to assess their appetite for this type of market-place. Overall 
respondents were positive about the market opportunities and access to additional revenue streams 
that the platform could provide, with most respondents interested in the extra revenue potential which 
could be achieved through gaining a DNO contract (Open Utility, 2017). 
One of the recurring themes in the consultation was the need for transparency in DNO service 
requirements: where they would be needed, and what types of services they would be procuring i.e. 
turn up/ down, signal following or frequency response. Whilst several foresaw problems with DNOs 
resistance to changing their current practices and evolving into market service providers. Perceived 
barriers included: 
“Resistance from DNOs to support the transition from their old models based on creating and maintaining 
significant over-capacity in distribution networks to allow for peak demand and peak generation events, to 
a smarter system enabled by locally managed flexibility and real-time data processing (ibid).” 
There was also scepticism from some around the current policy and regulatory landscape and whether 
barriers to accessing markets would be relieved or persist: 
 “Flexibility procurement is currently so complex that outdated market mechanisms persist (e.g. in 
balancing services) or it is just abandoned in favour of other less efficient practices (DNOs upgrading 
networks) (ibid).” 
  
                                                                    
18 Email correspondence with an aggregator June 2018 
19 To date all the DNOs in GB have announced that they will partner with Piclo Flex, apart from WPD. 
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4. Conclusion 
 
The role of aggregators is to act as an intermediary between multiple players and a market-place 
(Garcia-Rundstadler, 2018). The scope of that market-place could include Wholesale Markets, 
Balancing Markets, Capacity Markets and other market services such as ancillary services, flexibility 
platforms and local energy markets. However, at present, independent aggregators are limited in 
which of these markets they can currently access due to different policy and regulatory procedures that 
are in place across Europe. 
Whilst there is need for a standardised approach across Europe to enable independent aggregators to 
participate in the energy markets, to date this has been seen as problematical due to different market 
approaches in individual Member States. USEF’s Aggregator Workstream have therefore designed 
seven different models which they claim could be utilised Europe-wide. However, arguments still exist 
regarding independent aggregators position in relation to suppliers and BRPs, with most arguments 
relating to the issue of whether compensation should be paid to suppliers and whether prior contracts 
need to be arranged with customers suppliers before trading can take place. This stifles competition 
and effectively squeezes the independent aggregator out of many market places - even where they do 
technically have access to trade. 
In GB the Smart Systems and Flexibility Plan acknowledges market access barriers to independent 
aggregators. Of greatest significance is access to the BSC which should be alleviated under 
Modification P344 to be implemented in February 2019; in advance of Project TERRE in December 
2019. In the meantime, several previously independent aggregators in GB have taken the route of 
becoming licensed suppliers in order to circumnavigate restrictions. This is an expensive process which 
not every small aggregator will be able to afford, nor should they have to. However, by becoming 
suppliers this has enabled access to the more lucrative Balancing Market ahead of the anticipated 
changes to the BSC for those whom have followed this route.  
Currently in GB aggregators don’t need prior permission from suppliers to trade, which differs from the 
situation in many other EU Member States. However, in Ofgem’s Open Letter which was published 
alongside the Smart Systems and Flexibility Plan, there are concerning undertones in the claim that 
Ofgem believe that compensation may be agreed in the retail contract between the supplier and the 
consumer. This is in contrast to the aggregator model proposed by SEDC which promotes a centralised 
system for handling adjustments and communication in order to preserve confidentiality and increase 
competition; and which could deter customers from engaging in aggregation services. A combination 
of these SEDC principles and USEF model 6 and 7 (Central Settlement and Net Benefit) could be 
implemented in GB, rather than relying on pre-arranged contracts. 
Additionally, aggregation should be about bringing small-scale generation into the marketplace. All 
current literature on aggregation assumes a DSR-role for these aggregators; however, this is missing 
the point on the wider advantages that could be achieved by bundling DER resources into supply and 
demand markets. Given BEIS’s recent announcement to close the Feed-in-Tariff from 1 April 2019 
(BEIS, 2018) this could also give rise to new markets for the aggregation of small-scale commercial and 
domestic generation in the future which aggregators should capitalise on. 
Given the acknowledged benefits which independent aggregators can provide to the energy system – 
benefits which will inevitably increase as European markets become more reliant on intermittent 
generation – it is concerning how difficult it is for independent aggregators to be able to participate. 
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Whilst energy policy and regulation abounds with phrases such as ‘technology neutral’ and ‘level-
playing field’ when you consider the significant difficulties which are imposed on one market sector you 
can see how GB energy policy and regulation (and the wider EU) is still entrenched in incumbency 
thinking. Indeed, competition is fierce and incumbent market actors will want to underpin their own 
business models for as long as possible; whilst also attempting to gain a stronghold on emergent 
practices. GB has however recognised this fact and is actively attempting to remove barriers. 
Business Secretary Greg Clark announced in a speech on 15 November 2018 that: 
“Incumbents have often been able to put their interests ahead of those [of] entrants or consumers. 
We need to find a solution that harnesses industry knowledge of the system without handing over 
the keys to insiders (Clark, 2018)”. 
Clark promised a full review into industry codes and code governance, to enable innovators to enter the 
markets, claiming that “energy regulation must be agile and responsive if it is to reap the great 
opportunities of the smart, digital economy (ibid)”. 
This is potentially good news for aggregators in GB. Although change has been a long time coming; it is 
actually now being delivered; with 2019 set to be a pivotal year for the inclusion of aggregated 
resources in the Balancing Market. However, independent aggregators will still need to secure foot 
room in an industry which is iteratively changing around them; or face being further squeezed by new 
products and services entering the market-place. Aggregators must be enabled to navigate across all 
emergent market opportunities in order to bring DER into the energy system at scale; and for both 
providers and consumers to realise the benefits of a smarter, more flexible energy system. 
Recommendations  
Based on the barriers identified in this Working Paper we propose the following recommendations for 
change in order to increase the remit of independent aggregators in European electricity markets: 
1. ROLE – the European Commission should continue to ratify the role of aggregators across Europe. 
A standard framework approach needs to be agreed which will enable the participation of 
independent aggregators in all wholesale and retail markets. This should include the ability for 
aggregators to contract with customers without needing prior permission from the customers 
supplier. We support the Code of Conduct implemented in GB which will provide assurance to 
market participants on industry standards that aggregators should comply with. A similar Code 
should be applied across Europe as it not only reassures potential customers; it also gives 
aggregators professional recognition as legitimate market actors. 
2. COMPENSATION – this has proven to be the most difficult issue to reconcile across Europe. USEF’s 
7 Models for aggregators (Figure 2 earlier) is useful for contextualizing the differences between 
different market structures and recognizing the difficulties in retrospectively adjusting the existing 
market mechanisms. However, Member States should adopt the model which best incentivises 
independent aggregators into their wholesale and retail markets. In most cases this is likely to be 
through not requiring prior contractual arrangements between suppliers and customers or 
aggregators. 
3. DSO MARKETS – In line with European regulation DSOs should not own or operate their own 
flexibility resources such as storage as this is anti-competitive. Neither should they be undermining 
market competition by acting as regional aggregators themselves. Instead DSOs should be 
procuring market services from a wide range of local providers, creating a new marketplace for 
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aggregators and DER providers to help optimise local capacity and relieve network constraints. 
DSOs should also allow value stacking across markets in order for DER providers to realise the 
maximum economic potential of their assets. 
4. AGGREGATED GENERATION – more emphasis should be given to the system benefits which can 
be provided through the aggregation of small-scale generation; including domestic generation. 
Aggregation of these small-scale generation resources at the distribution level could give rise to 
new markets, such as local energy markets, which aggregators should capitalise on.  
5. CAPACITY MARKET (GB) – BEIS should consider the full inclusion of DSR when reviewing the 
Capacity Market Rules, allowing DSR an equal footing with generation. This should include 
reviewing the length of contracts awarded as well as the minimum capacity size. 
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6. Glossary 
 
BEIS Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy 
BM  Balancing Market 
BMU balancing mechanism unit 
BRP balancing responsible party 
BSC Balancing and Settlement Code 
CAPEX capital expenditure 
CM Capacity Market 
CVA central volume allocation 
DER distributed energy resources 
DR demand response 
DSR demand side response 
DNO Distribution Network Operator 
DSO Distribution System Operator 
ENA Energy Networks Association 
EPG Energy Policy Group (at the University of Exeter) 
ESO Electricity System Operator (National Grid) 
GSP grid supply point 
LEM local energy market 
NIA network innovation allowance 
NIC network innovation competition 
OPEX operational expenditure 
P2P Peer to Peer trading 
PPA power purchase agreement 
RAP Regulatory Assistance Project 
RES renewable energy sources 
RIIO Regulation = Incentives + Innovation + Outputs 
SEDC Smart Energy Demand Coalition 
SVA supplier volume allocation 
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TA Transitional Arrangements (Capacity Market) 
TERRE Trans European Replacement Reserves Exchange 
TSO Transmission System Operator 
UKPN UK Power Networks (DNO) 
VLP virtual lead party 
VPP virtual power plant 
WM Wholesale Market 
WPD Western Power Distribution (DNO) 
